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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

guage of the decree awarding permanent alimony to the wife manifests
"unequivocally an intent" to bind the heirs of the husband after death,
the allowance of alimony will not terminate with the death of the husband. 3 ' Thus, "the court does have power to decree that alimony shall be
paid after the death of the spouse, and where the decree expressly so provides, it will be enforced and recognized ....
,,32 In Illinois, the situation
action can consent to
also presents itself whereby the parties to a divorce
33
decree.
the
into
agreement
their
incorporate
Each of the two different views concerning alimony after the death of
the husband has its own particular disadvantages. In states where the rule
is that alimony terminates on the death of the husband, the wife who has
divorced the husband for his fault may after his death-no matter how
large his estate-find herself destitute. On the other hand, under the holdings allowing payments after the husband's death, the estate of the husband may be changed by or encumbered with the duty of support owing
to the ex-wife. The settlement of estates could thus be indefinitely prolonged, and funds belonging to the assets might have to be diverted, and
used to make provision for such support. Therefore, a court, in deciding
what rule to adopt, would seem to be limited to choosing between two
rules, both of which, as pointed out, are subject to certain inherent weaknesses.
31 Lennahan

v. O'Keefe, 107 Ill.
620 (1883).

32 Cross v. Cross, S Il.2d 456, 462, 125 N.E. 2d 488, 491 (1955).
33

Storey v. Storey, 125 111.
608, 18 N.E. 329 (1888).

DOMESTIC RELATIONS-U.S. SUPREME COURT HOLDS
THAT HUSBAND AND WIFE CAN BE GUILTY
OF CONSPIRACY
The defendants, husband and wife, were charged with conspiring to
illegally bring goods into the United States and thereafter to conceal
and transport the goods. The indictment charged the defendants with
violating section 371 of title 18 of the United States Code." The United
States District Court for the District of Southern California dismissed
the indictment on the grounds that it did not state an offense. The case
went to the United States Supreme Court on direct review. The Court, in
1 18 U.S.C.A. §371 (Supp. 1959), which provides: "If two or more persons conspire
either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States,
or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose and one or more of such
persons do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined ......
(Emphasis added.) This section was enacted in connection with 18 U.S.C.A. S545
(Supp. 1959), which deals with smuggling goods into the United States.
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reversing the lower court's decision, decided that a husband and wife
can conspire to commit a crime in violation of the federal statute.2 Three
Justices dissented. United States v. Dege, 364 U.S. 51 (1960).
Criminal conspiracy is generally defined as "[A] combination between
two or more persons to do an unlawful or criminal act, or to do a lawful
act by criminal or unlawful means. ' 3 As is apparent from the conspiracy
statute and the definition, at least two persons are necessary to commit
the crime of conspiracy. The question raised by the Dege case is whether
or not a husband and wife are to be considered as two separate persons,
capable of conspiring with each other within the interpretation of the
statute. At early common law, the husband wife were considered one,
that one being the husband. This rule was given its authoritative expression by Hawkins in his Pleas of the Crown in which he stated:
It plainly appears from the words of the statute, that one person alone cannot
be guilty of conspiring within the purport of it; from whence it follows ...
that no such prosecution is maintainable against a husband and wife only, because they are esteemed but one person in law, and are presumed to have but
one will.4
There has been some criticism that the common-law rule was merely
pronounced in textbooks and treatises but there was no case in which the
rule was applied by an English court. 5
Early American cases dealt with the problem in dicta. Generally, these
cases" affirmed the common-law rule without inquiring into its soundness. 7 People v. Miller8 was the first American case in point to state that
a husband and wife cannot be convicted of criminal conspiracy. Subsequent early American decisions affirmed this rule. 9 The basic rationale
of these cases was the common-law rationale above indicated, namely,
2 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 (Supp. 1959).

' United States v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789, 794 (3rd Cir. 1942).
4 1 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 448-449 (8th ed. Curwood 1824).
;,Williams, Legal Unity of Husband and Wife, 10 MODERN L. REV. 16-21 (1947).

Contra, Mawji v. Reginam, 41 Crm. App. R. 69, 1 All E.R. 385 (Privy Council, 1957);
Kowbel v. The Queen, 110 Can. Cr. Cas. 47,4 D.L.R. 337 (1954).
6Commonwealth v. Kendig, 18 Pa. Dist. 659 (1909); State v. Clark, 9 Houst. 536, 33
Ad. 310 (Del. 1891); People v. Richards, 67 Cal. 412, 7 Pac. 828 (1885); State v. Christianbury, 44 N.C. 46 (1852).
7

But see, by way of dictum, Smith v. State, 48 Tex. Crim. 233, 89 S.W. 817 (1905).

8 82 Cal. 107, 22 Pac. 934 (1889).
9

People v. MacMullen, 134 Cal. App. 81, 24 P.2d 794 (1933); Worthy v. Birk, 224

I11.App. 574 (1922) (which stated that the Married Women's Act did not in the least
modify the common-law rule); Merrill v. Marshall, 113 I11.App. 447 (1904) (where de-

fendant's statement that the plaintiff and her husband conspired to defraud another was
not held to be slander, since at common law a husband and wife could not be guilty of
conspiracy).
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that marriage united the husband and wife into one legal entity, so that
they were not considered as two separate persons, and thus were not
capable of committing the crime of conspiracy. The first American case
rejecting the common-law rule and convicting a husband and wife of
criminal conspiracy was Dalton v. People.'0 There the Supreme Court
of Colorado stated that Colorado's Married Women's Act abrogated the
common law rule. Later state decisions," using the same reasoning as the
Dalton case, have expressly rejected the common-law rule and have accepted the modern view of the relationship between man and wife. The
Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Martin, 2 expressly rejected the common-law rule on the grounds that the changed status of married women
would no longer permit such a fiction.
The federal courts at first followed the common-law rule used in most
state courts. In Dawson v. United States,'3 for example, the common-law
doctrine was retained. The Dawson Court held:
[A] rule so well established and so generally
recognized by moderwauthori14
tics should not be judicially repealed.
Federal decisions after Dawson,15 citing the Dawson case as authority,
affirmed the common-law rule. But when a husband and wife were convicted of violating a federal conspiracy statute in Johnson v. United
States,16 the court in that case stated that legislation had made the common-law view obsolete: "Acts of Congress have established the separation
of husband and wife as to property, contracts, and torts. . .. ,,"7
Subsequent federal cases' followed the reasoning of the Johnson case.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the Dege case, has agreed
with the viewpoint of the later state and federal decisions. The Court
held that the present day status of women in this country would not
permit the fiction of the unity of the husband and wife to be followed
in regard to criminal conspiracy. In reality, the wife has the same rights
10 68 Colo.44, 189 Pac. 37 (1920).
ttPeople v.Martin, 4 Ill.2d
105, 122 N.E.2d 245 (1954); Marks v.State, 144 Tex.
Crim. 509, 164 S.W.2d 690 (1942). Contra, People v. Keller, 165 Cal. App.2d 419, 332
P.2d 174 (1958); State v. Struck, 44 N.J. Super. 274 (County Ct.), 129 A.2d 910 (1957).
12 People v. Martin, supra note 11.
1a 10 F.2d 106 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 687 (1926).
14

Id. at 108.

15 Gros v. United States, 138 F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1943); United States v. Shaddix, 43
F. Supp. 330 (S. D. Miss. 1942).
16 157 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1946).

Ibid.
18 Wright v.United States, 243 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1957); Kivette v. United States,
230 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1956); Thompson v. United States, 227 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1955).
17
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as her husband, and husband and wife must be treated as separate entities.
The dissent strongly urged that law enforcement in conspiracy must consider the confidential relationship of marriage, and that the rejection of
the common-law rule endangers such relationship.' 9 The dissenting
opinion further charged that only Congress should, if it so desires, dismiss
such a well established rule.20 The majority of the Court stated, on the
other hand, that it would be false to imply that Congress intended to
retain the common-law doctrine in light of the present status of married
women.
Recent English and Canadian decisions have retained the common-law
rule. In Kowbel v. The Queen,21 the court held that such a well established rule should not be judicially repealed. 22 The Privy Council, in
Mawji v. The Queen,23 simply stated that the common-law rule was still
retained. Apparently consideration was not given to the increased rights
of women.
The Supreme Court's decision in the Dege case has these effects: (1)
It settles the conflicting lower federal court decisions; (2) it will be a
binding authority on future federal decisions applying federal conspiracy
law; and (3) the decision is persuasive authority for the basis of future
state decisions. But the ultimate effect of this decision is to increase married women's liabilities by refusing to recognize certain feudal notions
concerning coverture and criminal responsibility.
19 For discussion of the contrary view see Williams, Legal Unity of Husband and
WVife, 10 MODERN L. REv. 16-21 (1947).
20 Accord, Dawson v. United States, 10 F.2d 106 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S.
687 (1926).
21

110 Can. Cr. Cas. 47, 4 D.L.R. 337 (1954).

22 Contra, dissent in the Kowbel case, 4 D.L.R. at 344.
41 Crim. App. R. 69, 1 All E.R. 385 (Privv Council, 1957).

EVIDENCE-WIFE MAY BE COMPELLED TO TESTIFY
AGAINST HUSBAND
The defendant was indicted under the White Slave Traffic Act (more
commonly known as the Mann Act),' for knowingly transporting his
wife in interstate commerce for the purpose of prostitution. Defendant
was convicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama; the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction, and the United States Supreme Court, on
certiorari, affirmed the appellate court's decision. The Supreme Court
118 U.S.C.A. 5 2421 (Supp. 1959),

